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Evolution and Implementation of the Rastra Program in Indonesia 
C. Peter Timmer, Hastuti, and Sudarno Sumarto 
Introduction 
Among the countries reviewed in this volume, only Indonesia has not engaged in major reforms 
of its food subsidy program, at least until recently. Its flagship food subsidy program Rastra, 
formerly Raskin (Rice for the Poor),1 has made some improvements in delivery, but its overall 
performance continues to be limited. As such, some rethinking of the business model as well as 
the form of transfers provided is overdue. 
 Meanwhile, Indonesia has achieved significant progress in building and scaling up its 
cash transfer programs. Reflecting the progress achieved, the government recently took 
important steps toward reforming and modernizing Rastra. As this chapter shows, these steps are 
in line with global trends in the evolution of food-based social assistance. However, the 
international experience also suggests that such transitions will take time, will need to be 
sustained politically, will need to go beyond Rastra itself, and will require revisiting both the role 
of actors in different sectors and the objectives.  
 This chapter explores the history, design, implementation, and impact of Indonesia’s 
experience with food-based social safety nets. That experience started well before the 
implementation of Rastra—a program introduced after the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 that 
distributes rice directly to poor households at heavily subsidized prices. The chapter examines 
that history (a) for insights into the rationale behind the broad concern in Indonesia for providing 
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basic food security to its citizens and the specific role of rice in it and (b) for clues that reveal the 
underlying political economy of the programs’ design and implementation. 
 As illustrated in chapter 1 of this volume, until recently the nature and design of Rastra 
had changed relatively little over time, but the program was, and largely still is, woven into a 
broader set of agricultural and price management objectives. Indonesia’s approach to food 
security is remarkably well studied and documented, from Dutch colonial days to the present. 
However, the rich historical record, full of repeated food crises linked to institutional learning, 
provides only limited insights into the future of food-based safety nets in the country. Indonesia 
is attempting a radical reform of Rastra, including cashing out its benefits everywhere that food 
(rice) markets are working reasonably effectively and leaving only isolated areas, mostly in 
Eastern Indonesia, where the direct delivery of rice remains a cost-effective means of providing 
food security to poor households. 
 Even in those circumstances, Rastra needs to be seen as part of a much broader array of 
social safety nets. It has been understood for several decades that effective food policy—one that 
is successful in reducing poverty and hunger to low levels within a generation—needs to employ 
all the levers of economic development, not just those available to ministries of health or 
agriculture. 
 The chapter reviews the history of Indonesia’s approach to food security for its citizens. 
It focuses particularly on three basic ways to achieve that goal: (a) stabilizing rice prices, 
especially in urban markets; (b) generating a widespread process of pro-poor growth that pulls 
the rural poor into a rapidly expanding economy; and (c) providing direct food subsidies to poor 
households, which it has pursued since 1998 through Rastra. The first half of the chapter lays out 
the historical and political economy perspective; the second half reviews the design, 
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implementation, and impact of Rastra as of early 2017 and discusses briefly the most recent 
pilots to reform it. A final section discusses the lessons learned. 
 
The Historical Origins of Rastra 
Guaranteeing that food is available on a reliable and regular basis to all citizens is part of the 
“mandate of heaven” under which all Asian rulers are empowered, whether democratic or 
authoritarian.2 Indonesia is no exception. Its rulers have tried to maintain ready access to 
affordable rice since at least the seventeenth century. For most of the nation’s history, the main 
social safety net in Indonesia has been a public guarantee that rice would be available in urban 
markets at affordable (and stable) prices. If some citizens were too poor to buy this market-
priced rice, they suffered, or they were helped by local community organizations. When the state 
failed in this obligation, it often lost power. 
 That pattern is centuries old throughout Asia, but it would have resulted in food security 
for only a minority of urban households unless further steps were taken. Several possible 
approaches could extend the paradigm of food security in Asia. One approach is to achieve 
widespread, inclusive economic growth that brings the great mass of the population above a 
meaningful poverty line, so that stable rice prices in key urban markets really do guarantee food 
security for an increasing share of the population (as many rural workers move to urban jobs). 
Two reinforcing factors would eliminate rural poverty: people would migrate to urban 
opportunities, and the state would stimulate farm incomes for the remaining rural population by 
maintaining higher commodity prices. That approach is widespread in all high-income countries 
and is a popular political strategy that has uniformly been rewarded by electoral success for 
parties that follow it. To work, however, the approach needs (a) a reasonably wealthy urban 
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middle class that willingly pays higher food prices and (b) a progressively smaller and more 
productive agricultural workforce.  
 A second approach is to protect agriculture much earlier in the historical process of 
structural transformation, when farmers (especially, in Asia, rice farmers) become a very potent 
voting bloc in newly formed democratic societies. Many poor households remain—in both rural 
and urban areas—but they are not numerous enough to outvote a coalition of urban middle-class 
households, which want to guarantee supplies of rice in their local markets, and of farmers, who 
want higher rice prices to compensate for the loss of economic competitiveness in the production 
of labor-intensive crops (especially rice). This is the Indonesian story, but it also resonates in 
Malaysia, Thailand, and even China. 
 How can politicians reconcile rice prices that are high enough to ensure food security 
through increased rice production with the existence of a substantial proportion of households 
that are unable to afford that rice? The answer is obvious, both politically and logistically. 
Distributing rice directly to poor households (despite how ineffective the actual delivery system 
might be) is a political winner. And for the food logistics agency, previously charged with 
stabilizing rice prices around long-run trends in world prices, the reality of high domestic rice 
prices sharply reduces the need for those services. A new mandate—to procure rice at high prices 
from farmers and deliver it at subsidized prices to poor households—gives that agency a new 
lease on life.  
 This approach, established for the last decades as the political norm in Indonesia, was an 
innovation when viewed through the lens of Indonesia’s long history of repeated food crises and 
government responses. A slightly arbitrary list of 10 food crises over several centuries is 
presented here. These crises have come from both too little and too much rice, and stability has 
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been the dominant policy goal, sometimes sacrificing the short-run welfare of farmers in favor of 
the welfare of consumers and sometimes the opposite. In all the crises, however, institutional 
learning occurred, as coping mechanisms developed to keep governments in power. The 
following 10 crises shaped Indonesia’s approach to food security. 
 First, the Indonesian sultanates rule with a “mandate from heaven,” known as “rice for 
the people.” Sultan Amangkurat I prohibited the exportation of rice from Java in 1655 in 
response to a drought that sent rice prices up by 300 percent. 
 Second, the Dutch took over the rice economy of the Netherlands East Indies in March 
1933, in response to collapsing rice prices in the region. Rice milling, inter-island and 
international trade in rice, and price formation were all tightly controlled by government 
agencies, most of them newly formed for the task (Boeke 1946). The Dutch effort at government 
control of the rice economy resonates to this day. 
 Third, the collapse of the Sukarno government in 1966, after a decade of spiraling 
inflation, increased poverty, and repeated shortages of rice in urban markets, gave the new 
Suharto government a mandate for stability—a mandate it eagerly sought in the wake of 
widespread violence and turmoil during the transition. Badan Urusan Logistik (BULOG, the 
State Logistics Board) is a food logistics agency established to control rice prices, with an 
agency head who reported directly to the president and with a line of credit at subsidized interest 
rates from the central bank. 
 Fourth, the world food crisis in 1972–73 caught the Indonesian government—and 
BULOG—unprepared. After several years of price stability, rice prices spiraled out of control, 
and the government quickly tried to arrange emergency imports from a world rice market that 
disappeared for nearly a year. The response, once control was regained late in 1973, was to 
 6 
formulate plans for paying greater attention to agricultural development, increasing productivity 
of the rice sector, and keeping rice prices stable (Timmer 1975). 
 The fifth food crisis followed the collapse of commodity prices in world markets in the 
mid-1980s, including for rice, and again caught BULOG unprepared. As the Dutch learned 
during the Great Depression in the 1930s, surpluses are just as hard to manage as shortages. A 
major reevaluation of how to define and maintain food security in Indonesia was commissioned.3 
A new focus on poverty came to the fore with the realization that surplus rice could be 
distributed as part of a social safety net. By 1991, BULOG had implemented a trial of Operasi 
Pasar Khusus (OPK, Special Market Operations) to deliver rice directly to drought-stricken 
villages as a poverty-relief effort (Timmer and others 1992). 
 In the sixth crisis, BULOG’s focus on disposing of rice surpluses caused it to lose track 
of its actual stock in mid-1994. A drought caused rice production to fall, but BULOG did not 
respond when stocks were depleted early in 1995, before the new rice harvest started in March. 
A rice crisis was in the making. President Suharto replaced the head of BULOG, and the new 
head ordered emergency imports that arrived just in time to keep rice prices from getting out of 
control. Knowing what to do makes all the difference, but business as usual was a failure. Still, 
by August 1996, it was possible for the Jakarta Post to report a story (based on an interview with 
Timmer) that headlined “BULOG to limit itself to poverty alleviation,” a recognition of the 
changing dynamics in the rice economy. 
 Seventh, the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 caused Indonesia to lose control of its 
macroeconomy. Again, an important lesson was learned: it is impossible to stabilize rice prices 
when the macroeconomy and exchange rate are out of control. A new OPK emerged out of the 
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macroeconomic and political chaos. This program almost immediately became the largest 
element in the country’s shift to targeted social safety nets (Tabor and Sawit 2001). 
 Eighth, with the emergence of democracy in 1998, the political economy of food security 
took an entirely new direction. The dominant approach was to impose high rice prices as a 
political policy choice in 2004–06, which had a significant impact on the poor. Rastra, which 
was the OPK program relabeled, became the political answer to the problems of food insecurity 
caused by high rice prices. Although rice self-sufficiency had long been a key objective of 
Indonesia’s drive for food security, stable rice prices had always trumped the desire to restrict 
imports (Timmer 2003). That political calculus changed in the first half of the 2000s. 
 Ninth, Indonesia was quite successful in getting through the 2007–08 world food crisis, 
partly because its domestic prices were already high. When the minister of trade announced a 
ban on rice exports early in 2008, the world rice market took little notice because Indonesia had 
never been a significant rice exporter. But domestic consumers and traders were reassured that 
ample supplies were available, so there was no panicked hoarding of the sort seen in the 
Philippines and even in urban markets in Vietnam. Stable domestic prices, even if very high, 
were a political winner for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s second presidential campaign in 2009. 
 Tenth, BULOG faced rice shortages in 2015–16, the worst El Niño year on record. Some 
officials in the new Jokowi government tried to order imports in a timely fashion, even recalling 
publicly the fall of the Suharto government over spiraling rice prices during the previously worst 
El Niño on record in 1997–98, when imports also were delayed. Many contracts were delayed or 
canceled (although nearly 1 million tons of imported rice did arrive before the end of February 
2016). Rice prices spiraled, BULOG had to cut back deliveries to Rastra recipients, and once 
again the country learned that rice self-sufficiency is not food security. Nascent efforts to reform 
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Rastra, even to convert it to cash or vouchers in urban settings and rural areas with good market 
infrastructure, were generally delayed, although they are now being tested in several cities. 
 Crises focus the mind and political action. Perhaps more important, they shape the 
expectations—among the citizenry and policy makers alike—about appropriate public actions 
and private responses in a highly volatile food system. Interpreting the long-run impact of these 
repeated food crises over nearly four centuries of Indonesian history is a matter of judgment, of 
course, but at least three phases are visible in the evolution of policy approaches to food security.  
 First, stabilizing rice prices in urban markets has long been the political touchstone of 
legitimacy: a reasonably stable food economy seems to be an essential ingredient of sustainable 
economic growth. Second, a strategy of pro-poor growth, building on the potential to improve 
rural labor productivity through broad-based agricultural development, brought the rural poor 
into the political calculus of food security (and their participation made food more available and 
accessible). And third, perhaps prematurely, the country moved explicitly to a targeted, food-
based social safety net—implemented through Rastra—as the offset to a political strategy of 
wooing the political loyalty of rice farmers by keeping rice prices high. Each of these phases is 
discussed in turn. 
 
Phase 1: Rice Price Stabilization in Indonesia 
Why did Indonesia attempt to stabilize rice prices for extended periods of time? No one in 
Indonesia—policy makers, academics, journalists, or the “man in the street”—has ever doubted 
that stable rice prices are essential to political stability and economic growth. During the chaotic 
and often violent transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto in the mid-1960s, rice was, as the 
 9 
influential student newspaper Harian KAMI put it on September 14, 1967, “the barometer of the 
economy.” 
The Motivation for Rice Price Stabilization in Indonesia: A Brief Overview 
Food security as a political concept requires an operational definition.4 In most Asian countries 
the definition has taken the form of stable domestic prices relative to world prices, thus requiring 
state control over trade flows in rice. To minimize the need to resort to trade at all and to avoid 
the uncertainties in the international price of rice, self-sufficiency has also become a popular 
objective. It has become more important as countries have become rich enough to implement 
policies that achieve greater degrees of self-sufficiency.  
 A further impetus toward greater domestic rice production has been the fear of food 
shortages in urban areas, which evoke a universal and visceral reaction. Governments are held 
accountable for provisioning cities at reasonable costs, and citizens have repeatedly 
demonstrated their capacity to bring down governments that fail in this obligation.5 Acute food 
shortages—not the average level of food prices—are what induce antigovernment panic, 
however. Sharp price rises are simply the mirror image of food shortages.  
 Indonesia provides a particularly vivid case study of policy initiatives that are designed 
specifically to stabilize the domestic price of rice—using imports or domestic production to 
avoid food shortages—with a careful analytical debate paralleling the policy actions. The role of 
trade versus domestic production as the basis for food security has been analyzed and discussed 
in a surprisingly open and articulate manner since the beginning of the Suharto government in 
1966.  
 The proximate definition of food security in Indonesia has always revolved around price 
stability, especially for the price of rice, the country’s primary food staple. The analysis that 
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underpinned this approach never focused only on the static and partial equilibrium consequences 
of changes in rice prices. Instead, an effort was made, even well before computable general 
equilibrium models became a standard tool of policy analysis, to consider the dynamic and 
economywide ramifications of price policy, the distributional consequences for farmers and 
consumers, and the role of other commodities in the rice stabilization program. 
The Role of Self-Sufficiency in Rice in Ensuring Food Security 
Self-sufficiency in rice and other foodstuffs such as sugar and soybeans has been a consistent (if 
often rhetorical) objective of Indonesian agricultural policy since the beginning of the New 
Order regime of President Suharto in 1967 (Timmer 1975). Historical and production cost data 
based on farm surveys suggest that self-sufficiency in rice has often been less costly (on average 
and over the long run) than large-scale rice imports from the world market, at least when the 
green revolution in rice production technology was spreading rapidly. Because of fluctuations 
due to weather (especially El Niño events), diseases, and pests, however, rice production in 
Indonesia is unstable, and productivity growth has slowed. In most years, Indonesia’s rice 
production is below the normal level of rice consumption.  
 To stabilize the rice economy, BULOG was charged with operating a floor and ceiling 
price policy using domestic buffer stocks to smooth out year-to-year fluctuations in production 
and consumption. The goal was to keep rice consumption on a smooth trend despite unstable 
production. The primary policy instrument for stabilizing rice consumption is the stabilization of 
rice prices, which has been BULOG’s most important task.6 
 Successful stabilization of rice prices between policy-determined floor and ceiling prices 
requires an active and ongoing analytical capacity—to determine annually the appropriate 
levels—that is linked directly to the political (and budgetary) decision-making process. Indonesia 
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developed this capacity gradually through the early 1970s and 1980s. Much of that analytical 
effort is now in the public record.7 
 From the late 1960s until the early 1980s, BULOG routinely used imports and open-
market sales of rice to balance supply and demand in its defense of a floor and ceiling price for 
rice. The world food crisis in 1972–73 stimulated serious efforts to increase rice production, and 
the long-sought goal of rice self-sufficiency was achieved in the mid-1980s. The balancing role 
of international trade was superseded by the problems of managing domestic buffer stocks as the 
sole mechanism for smoothing seasonal and annual differences between production and 
consumption (Timmer 1996).8  
 For the 10 years of the fourth and fifth five-year development plans (Repelita IV and V), 
fiscal years 1983/84 to 1993/94, Indonesia was almost exactly self-sufficient in rice, on average, 
and per capita availability (consumption) increased smoothly in all years but two. In none of the 
individual years, however, was domestic production exactly equal to consumption. In some 
years—for example, 1984, 1989, and 1992—production was higher than consumption, and 
BULOG stocks increased. In other years—for example, 1985 and 1993—production also 
exceeded consumption, but, with BULOG warehouses full, the surplus was exported. In 1986, 
1987, 1990, and 1991, consumption was slightly higher than production, and BULOG stocks 
were drawn down. In 1988, 1992, and 1994, production was again less than the desired 
consumption level. With BULOG stocks low, external supplies were called on to provide 
stability to Indonesia’s rice markets. 
 The overall picture is one of stable growth in per capita rice consumption, relative 
stability in Indonesia’s rice market, and, perhaps most important from a political perspective, the 
achievement of self-sufficiency in rice (on average) for two consecutive five-year plan periods. 
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Figure 7.1 shows clearly that BULOG was quite successful in stabilizing rice prices from late 
1973, when it regained control of domestic prices after a good harvest, until the Asian financial 
crisis in late 1997. Table 7.1 presents the comparative evidence by time period using the 
coefficient of variation (CV), which is the standard deviation of monthly prices divided by the 
mean of prices. The reference for stability of domestic prices is what is happening to world 
prices.  
Figure 7.1 Real Prices of Domestic and Imported Rice in Indonesia, 1969–2012 
 
Source: Data and graphics provided by David Dawe, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, Bangkok. 
 
As table 7.1 shows, domestic rice prices have been somewhat more stable than world 
prices, but the relative stability is especially striking for the Suharto era from January 1969 to 
right before the Asian financial crisis in July 1997. During that period, when BULOG was most 
successful in its logistical operations, the domestic CV is less than a third of the world CV. The 
comparison would be even more striking if it ran from late 1973, after BULOG regained control 
of the Indonesian rice economy (and learned its lesson), until mid-1997. Since 1998 (and the 
establishment of democracy), BULOG has not been very successful at stabilizing rice prices, but 
keeping rice prices high seems to be the political objective rather than achieving stable or 
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efficient prices. Also worth pointing out is a sharp spike in 1998 in world rice prices as measured 
in real rupiah, a spike that does not appear when world rice prices are measured in U.S. dollars. 
The difference, of course, is that the Asian financial crisis caused the Indonesian rupiah to 
collapse. It is impossible to stabilize domestic rice prices in the middle of a meltdown of the 
economy and political system. 
Table 7.1 Real Prices of Rice in Indonesia, by Regime, 1969–2014 
Rp per kilogram 
Indicator 
Whole period, 
January 1969–July 
2014 
Suharto pre-1998 
Asian financial 
crisis, January 
1969–July 1997 
Post-Suharto, 
January 1999–July 
2014 
Post-2007/98 food 
price crisis, 
November 2008 –
July 2014 
Mean     
Domestic  5,132.91 4,303.20 6,562.17 7,490.28 
World 4,760.10 4,452.22 4,988.76 4,928.22 
     
Standard Deviation     
Domestic  1,263.43 410.94 943.61 563.05 
World 1,591.70 1,448.70 1,042.13 684.18 
     
Coefficient of variation     
Domestic 0.25 0.10 0.14 0.08 
World 0.33 0.33 0.21 0.14 
Source: Data provided by Peter Warr, Australian National University. 
Lessons from Indonesian Experience 
Increasing rice production was only part of the story of self-sufficiency and rising consumption 
of rice. The role of prices and price stability was also important in allowing consumers to 
maintain a smooth trend in rice consumption, even though production varied considerably from 
year to year. 
 A key element of the government’s involvement in reaching self-sufficiency is the level 
of rice prices maintained in the domestic economy. Other things being equal, a higher level of 
rice prices will increase rice production, decrease rice consumption, and make self-sufficiency 
easier to achieve. It has often been said that Indonesia can always be self-sufficient in rice at 
some price; the issue is whether consumers can maintain satisfactory levels of rice consumption 
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as well. But domestic rice prices do not exist in a vacuum. In particular, their level relative to the 
trend of prices in the world market and relative to the costs of farmers’ inputs (especially 
fertilizer prices) strongly influences the efficiency with which consumers and producers allocate 
the scarce economic resources of the society. 
 Stabilization itself is also an element in domestic production and its contribution to food 
security. The short-run policy issue is the level of BULOG stocks considered appropriate for 
maintaining stable rice prices. With infinite stocks, prices can be kept completely stable, but both 
economic theory and experience dictate that a finite level of stock cannot defend price stability 
under all circumstances.9 Accordingly, an important trade-off exists. Larger buffer stocks permit 
a longer period of stable prices, but at costs that rise exponentially with the size of the buffer 
stock. Smaller stocks cause prices to fluctuate more, but with substantial cost savings. The only 
escape from this apparent dilemma is to add a degree of freedom to the system by permitting 
supplies to move into or out of the country, once stocks are drawn down or warehouses are filled 
up. As noted, a rigid definition of self-sufficiency removed the operational role for imports for 
several years. Still, this experience of trying to understand the value of additional stocks in the 
Indonesian context was valuable, because, after the world food crisis in 2007–08, it helped with 
understanding the value of additional stocks at a global level (which must be self-sufficient by 
definition).10  
 Three elements of government policy interact to create the economic environment for 
self-sufficiency in rice and its subsequent role in food security: (a) public investments in rice 
production to maintain it on the trend of rice consumption—mostly in rice research and 
extension, irrigation facilities, and rural roads; (b) the establishment of a domestic level of rice 
(and fertilizer) prices that reflects their long-run opportunity costs in world markets (a 
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substantial, marketwide fertilizer subsidy in the mid-1980s was a major factor in boosting rice 
production to self-sufficiency, and the debate over fertilizer subsidies continues even today); and 
(c) the stabilization of domestic rice prices through market interventions using buffer stocks and 
imports, when politically feasible, as a balance wheel.  
 Each of those policy elements has powerful effects on efficiency individually, as well as 
direct effects on the state budget, and these effects make each component a separate, important 
policy issue. But the interconnections among the three elements make it impossible to set policy 
for one without having a substantial impact on the others. Consistency among all three elements 
is essential in the long run if substantial resources are not to be wasted. Achieving this 
consistency is clearly the most difficult aspect of designing a policy to ensure food security at the 
macroeconomic level. 
The New Policy Debate: Price Stability at What Price? 
Price stabilization has remained an important policy objective during surpluses and deficits, but 
the financial costs,11 feasible level of prices, and general policy thrust with respect to the 
agriculture sector differ sharply—that is, (a) when the rice economy is in surplus and the main 
political problem is maintaining the floor price for rice farmers and (b) when the rice economy is 
in deficit and urban prices are rising. Because of the high costs of storing rice in the tropics, the 
finite size of stocks, and the sharply limited role for imports for political reasons, wider margins 
between the floor price and ceiling price have become a de facto balance wheel as well, but these 
wider margins call into question the implicit assumption that food security and price stability are 
synonymous.  
 In 2004, Indonesia made a policy decision to raise domestic rice prices significantly 
above world prices (by preventing imports). In December 2004, the price of domestic rice was at 
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parity with the price of equivalent rice imports (figure 7.1). By February 2006, however, the 
price of domestic rice had risen 25 percent in real terms, whereas the price of equivalent rice on 
the world market had fallen 11 percent, an increase of more than a third in the relative price. In 
March 2007, the Statistics Indonesia National Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas) on poverty in 
Indonesia reported a significant increase in the poverty headcount ratio, despite fairly rapid 
economic growth nationwide (BPS 2015b). 
 In 2006, a vigorous debate developed in Indonesia over the causes of the increase in 
poverty, which included the reduction in the fuel subsidy in 2005 and the use of cash transfers to 
compensate poor households. The role of high rice prices and the import ban were hotly 
contested.12 Calls to allow rice imports went unheeded, and by March 2007, domestic rice prices 
were 57 percent higher than world prices. Poverty rates stayed high, and the number of near poor 
rose significantly. 
 The vigorous and open debate late in 2006 over the impact of the rice import ban led to 
discussions of how to arrange imports in a timely fashion to prevent further price increases and 
harm to the poor. By December 5, 2006, The Jakarta Post ran a headline story by Urip Hudiono 
in which Timmer was quoted as saying, “Banning rice imports [is] ‘not the right option.’” 
Options for managing the impending rice crisis by arranging emergency rice imports were 
prepared for the minister of trade, who immediately requested presidential permission to start the 
import process. A presidential decree was issued on December 9, 2006, authorizing imports. 
Unfortunately, there was enough political and bureaucratic opposition to prevent rice imports 
from arriving until late February, which was far too late to prevent a sharp spike in rice prices in 
December 2006–February 2007. The high poverty rates were directly caused by the decision to 
restrict rice imports and to keep domestic rice prices well above world prices (Warr 2011). 
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 Similar opposition to rice imports materialized late in 2015 and early in 2016, as the El 
Niño drought put pressure on domestic supplies and BULOG’s ability to procure rice 
domestically. Making the stabilization of rice prices the foundation of Indonesia’s food-based 
social safety net is clearly a thing of the past. 
Pro-Poor Growth and Food Security: The Inclusion of Rural Households in a 
Food-Based Social Safety Net 
Only 60 years ago, Indonesia was one of the poorest countries in Asia.13 The story of its poverty 
and poverty reduction is a story of the political and economic eras that determined the nation’s 
development trajectory: colonial rule and exploitation; authoritarian rule, coupled with sustained 
growth and then dramatic collapse; and, most recently, democracy accompanied by economic 
flux and tentative stabilization. At Indonesia’s independence, in 1945, the vast majority of its 
population was impoverished. By 1993, however, with poverty reduced to 14 percent of the 
population and annual economic growth at more than 7 percent, Indonesia was ranked, along 
with a handful of other East Asian countries, as a high-performing Asian economy (World Bank 
1993) and lauded for its astonishing transformation. To understand this remarkable turnaround, it 
is necessary to understand the key factors that drove the change in livelihoods of some 100 
million Indonesians.14  
 History has much to teach Indonesia as it struggles to reestablish economic growth and 
reconnect that growth to its remaining poor. Because Indonesia has experienced such sharp 
swings in its development path, a multitude of successes and also many failures are available to 
examine. Drawing on the vast historical literature in this area (Hofman, Rodrick-Jones, and Thee 
2004; MacIntyre 2003; Temple 2001; Timmer 2003), this section briefly sets out that history. It 
begins with the unfavorable starting point, focuses on the policies of the Suharto government that 
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brought about the structural transformation in the livelihoods of the poor, and then reflects on the 
causes and effects of the greatest economic crisis in Indonesian history. The story of three 
decades of sustained pro-poor growth, juxtaposed with the story of rapid collapse and recovery, 
provides useful insights for future policy making.  
Troubled History and Chronic Poverty 
For the duration of the 350-year period of Dutch colonial rule, the trade and tax regime favored 
Dutch extraction of income, with dire consequences for the Indonesian population. Analysis 
provided by Van der Eng and interpreted by Timmer enables an examination of growth, the 
severity of poverty through a comparison of annual food energy intake measured in kilocalories, 
and income elasticity of consumption over the past century (table 7.2). During the nineteenth 
century, growth in consumption was negative, estimated at −0.34 kilocalories per year, while the 
index of pro-poor growth (IPPG) was only a fraction of the long-term average,15 illustrating the 
severe disconnect between the situation of the poor and the modest economic growth that 
occurred during this period.  
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, when Dutch public opinion influenced the 
management of the colonies, a more developmental approach, known as “ethical policy,” was 
implemented briefly. The policy brought significant benefits both to the economy (growth 
reached 1.63 percent per year) and to the poor (food intake increased an annual average of 1.39 
kilocalories). But this investment in the country lasted for only a brief period. The collapse of 
world prices for export commodities in the 1920s and the abysmal economic management of 
Indonesia during the Great Depression16 resulted in the lowest rate of growth and pro-poor 
growth in any period before independence.  
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Table 7.2 Long-Term Patterns of Pro-Poor Growth in Indonesia, 1880–1990 
Time period 
Annual 
growth in 
income per 
capita (% per 
year) 
Annual 
growth in 
caloric 
consumption 
(% per year) 
Income 
elasticity of 
caloric 
consumption  
Index of 
pro-poor 
growth  
(IPPG)  
Dutch colonial exploitation, 1880–1905 0.33 −0.34 0.051 
0.165 
0.05 
Ethical Policy under the Dutch, 1905–25 1.63 1.39 0.878 
2.805 
4.57 
Depression, Pacific War, and fight for 
independence, 1925–50 
−2.42 −0.78 0.333 
1.064 
−2.57 
The Sukarno era, including the Guided 
Economy, 1950–66 
1.46 0.68 0.509 
1.626 
2.37 
The New Order regime of Suharto, 
1966–90 
3.45 2.10 0.595 
1.901 
6.56 
     
Long-term averages, 1880–1990 0.89 0.22 0.313 
1.000 
0.89 
Source: Timmer 2005. 
Note: See text and endnote 15 for the definition of IPPG and an explanation of how it is calculated and 
interpreted. Details of the regressions are provided in Timmer (2005), along with a full explanation of the analytical 
relationship between the overall incidence of poverty and the average income elasticity of demand for food energy. 
Income elasticity of food energy for the entire period from 1880 to 1990, estimated to be 0.313, is used as the long-
run base, scaled to 1 (italicized in the table). 
  
By the 1930s, the colonial authorities had built a significant network of irrigation and 
transport facilities, but there was very little investment in educating the nation’s population. 
Poverty increased significantly during World War II and the subsequent struggle for 
independence, which reached closure only with final acceptance by the Dutch in 1949. The 
tumultuous global period spanning the Great Depression, the Pacific War, and the fight for 
independence (1925–50) saw a marked deterioration in rates of per capita income growth (−2.42 
percent) and a negative rate of pro-poor growth (−2.57 percent). 
 By the early 1960s, as in other postindependence states, poverty had fallen in the postwar 
recovery, and Indonesia was muddling along with modest growth and weak but quasi-democratic 
governance. After Sukarno imposed “guided democracy” in 1959, however, the situation 
deteriorated sharply. By adopting an inward-looking development policy and severely neglecting 
agriculture, Indonesia was “a prime exemplar of the dangerously degenerative consequences of 
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weak governance and a sickly economy” (MacIntyre 2003, 1). Incomes fell dramatically, and the 
hyperinflation of 1965–66 had an adverse effect on the entire population, as the poverty rate 
increased rapidly and the economy collapsed.17 An estimated 70 percent of the population was 
absolutely poor by 1966. Hunger was widespread (Timmer 2003). In 1968, with no hint of the 
future, Gunnar Myrdal observed, “No economist holds out any hope for Indonesia” (Myrdal 
1968). 
A Period of Growth and Rapid Poverty Reduction 
The trajectory of growth and poverty transformed dramatically under the New Order government 
of President Suharto. Starting in 1968, for three remarkable decades, Indonesia’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew an average of 7.4 percent annually. As a result, in 1997 Indonesia’s per 
capita income reached US$906, more than quadruple the 1968 level.18 When compared with 
previous periods in Indonesian history, the quarter century from 1965 to 1990 saw an annual 
growth in caloric intake of 2.1 percent a year, 50 percent higher than the next best period in 
1905–25 and almost 10 times the long-term average. The IPPG reached 6.56 for the period 
1965–90—the highest in Indonesian history—seven times the long-term average and nearly half 
again as large as the next best period in 1905–25 (table 7.2). 
 As the export economy boomed in the late 1980s and early 1990s and overall GDP grew 
nearly 7 percent annually, roughly half of that growth was made up of nontradable goods and 
services, where most of the poor make a living (Timmer 1997, 2002, 2004). The structure of 
economic growth during this period led to a remarkably high growth elasticity of poverty (table 
7.3). 
Table 7.3 Growth Elasticity of Poverty in Indonesia, 1967–2002  
 Annual % change Growth elasticity of 
Time period Per capita income Poverty index poverty  
1967–76 5.48 −6.0 −1.09 
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1976–80 6.37 −8.1 −1.27 
1980–84 4.23 −6.8 −1.61 
1984–87 2.69 0.7 −2.60 
1987–90 6.66 −4.6 −0.81 
1990–93 5.41 −4.6 −0.85 
1993–96 5.23 −6.2 −1.19 
1996–99 3.25 9.9 −3.05 (+) 
1999–2002 2.49 −8.2 −3.29 
Source: Timmer 2005. 
Note: The growth elasticity of poverty is calculated as the ratio of the percentage reduction in the poverty 
headcount index relative to the percentage change in per capita income (in US$ purchasing power parity) from the 
World Bank database on pro-poor growth.  
 
 Sound macroeconomic management was strongly supported by investment in sectors that 
benefited the poor—education, health, family planning, and infrastructure—enabling the poor to 
benefit from the country’s oil windfall at the household level. The windfall also supported the 
development of widespread and large-scale investment in infrastructure assets, significantly 
lowering transaction costs.  
 The government’s success in reinstating macroeconomic stability and, through the 
exchange rate, bringing down the relative price of rice, was critical to Indonesia’s rapid reduction 
of the poverty rate from its crisis spike of 23.4 percent in 1999 to 18.2 percent in 2002. The fall 
in the relative price of rice (index of rice prices over all food prices) from 1.43 to 1.08 over the 
period from September 1998 to September 2000 was a key factor driving the decline in poverty 
over that period. Although the poverty headcount rates declined to precrisis levels, studies also 
suggest that the crisis had lasting impacts. Ravallion and Lokshin (2005) estimate that the 
poverty headcount index would have been about half what it was in 2002 had the crisis not taken 
place.  
 The crisis and recovery showed that the price of rice is the most important determinant of 
poverty at the household level in Indonesia. Macroeconomic price stability matters to the poor 
(Timmer 2004). Rice prices are important for poverty alleviation, not only because higher or 
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lower prices have direct, short-term benefits on the poorest quintiles but also because they play a 
key role in the structural transformation of the agriculture sector and economy as a whole. In 
agriculture, low rice prices encourage farmers to diversify crops and to plant less rice by making 
rice less valuable to farmers at the market. The result is a move toward crops that give the poor 
higher profit margins. In Indonesia, artificially high rice prices have slowed the crop 
diversification process as well as investments in nonfarm rural activities (Timmer 2004).  
 During the severe economic contraction in 1998–99, the government developed and 
extended several formal safety net programs. The Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS) social safety net 
programs, known until then for their patchy record, were extended to protect the chronically and 
transitory poor from the impacts of the crisis. Initially, these crash programs were directed to 
urban areas throughout the country, but they were also intended to reach rural areas where 
harvest failures were causing significant hardship. The JPS programs had four goals: (a) to 
ensure that the poor could obtain food at affordable prices, (b) to create employment, (c) to 
preserve access to social services such as health and education, and (d) to sustain local economic 
activity through regional block grants and small-scale credit programs (Sumarto, Suryahadi, and 
Pritchett 2001). Evidence highlights the mixed effectiveness of the various programs (SMERU 
2004). Although the scholarship program helped to keep children in school and the health card 
program improved access of the poor to public health facilities, the Rastra program saw higher 
levels of capture by upper quintiles. The next section analyzes the performance of Rastra.  
 
From Price Stability to Food Access: The Rastra Program 
The previous sections have highlighted the role played by price stability at the aggregate level. 
Yet stability does not mean affordability for net food consumers, especially when prices are 
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stable at exceptionally high levels. This disconnect, as pointed out, led the government to 
provide subsidized rice for poor households. In the following sections, the chapter moves from a 
historical macro-level perspective to a more micro-level perspective on design and 
implementation matters related to Rastra. 
 Rice accounts for nearly a quarter of the total average monthly expenditures among poor 
households, consuming 34 and 26 percent of the rural and urban poverty budgets, respectively. 
This finding suggests that the issue of food security—particularly in regard to rice as a staple 
food—still requires serious attention.  
 The adequacy of food in terms of quality and quantity is important for Indonesian 
development because several nutritional indicators still need attention. In terms of quantity, the 
proportion of people who consume less than the required daily intake of 1,400 or 2,000 calories 
remains quite high, at 8.5 and 35.3 percent, respectively, in 2013. In terms of nutritional quality, 
between 2007 and 2013, the nutritional status of children under five stagnated or even worsened, 
the prevalence of underweight children increased from 18.4 to 19.6 percent, stunting increased 
from 36.8 to 37.2 percent, and the prevalence of central obesity (accumulation of belly fat) rose 
from 18.8 to 26.6 percent. Only the prevalence of wasting improved slightly, falling from 13.6 
percent in 2007 to 12.1 percent in 2013 (Isdijoso and others 2014).  
 The government has made efforts to increase food security and adequacy, together with 
reducing poverty, through social protection and poverty alleviation programs. To ensure 
sufficient food, especially for low-income groups, the government has introduced food subsidies, 
primarily in the form of rice. Essentially, Rastra is a continuation of the OPK program, which 
was undertaken by the government during the 1997–98 economic crisis. It commenced in July 
1998 as part of a broader social safety net (JPS), with the aim of reducing the expenditure burden 
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on households by fulfilling basic needs with rice. Since January 2002, Rastra was broadened in 
scope, shifting from a project focused on responding to crisis situations through food subsidies to 
become a program aimed at social protection for the poor.  
 Rastra is the most well-funded social assistance program in Indonesia. In 2007, the total 
allocation for the program was Rp 6.6 trillion or around 43.1 percent of the total budget for 
social protection programs, and it covered as many as 15.7 million target households. In 2016, 
the total budget allocation for Rastra increased threefold, to Rp 21 trillion, with coverage of 15.5 
million households. The allocation for each household is 15 kilograms of rice per month at a 
price of Rp 1,600 per kilogram at the distribution point. Rastra now accounts for more than half 
of total social assistance expenditure.  
 Throughout its implementation, Rastra has undergone changes in relation to its 
institutionalization, coverage, frequency of distribution, quantity of rice allocations, cost of rice, 
and implementation mechanisms. Several of those changes were made to align the program with 
changes in budget allocations, poverty conditions, and rising costs. Others changes were made to 
improve the program’s effectiveness or to accommodate recommendations from various sources. 
 
Institutionalization 
Rastra cuts across sectors vertically and horizontally, and it engages many institutions at all 
levels of government. Nationally, the responsibility for implementation rests with the 
Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture (Menko PMK). Furthermore, each 
government leader at the provincial, district, subdistrict, and village levels is responsible for 
implementing Rastra in the respective region. Those leaders are also responsible for creating the 
 25 
Rastra coordination team in their region. At the village level,19 the coordination team is called 
the distribution team. 
 The membership of Rastra coordination teams cuts across sectors. At the central level, 
membership comprises representatives from Menko PMK, the Coordinating Ministry for the 
Economy, the Ministry of National Development Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry 
of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs, Statistics Indonesia (BPS), and BULOG. At the 
provincial and lower levels, membership is also taken from agencies at the relevant level of 
government with responsibilities similar to those at the national level. In general, Rastra 
coordination teams are tasked with coordinating and managing policy formulation, planning, 
quota determination, public socialization, complaint handling, monitoring and evaluation, and 
reporting (see annex 7A)  
 The organizational structure of Rastra has been subject to several adjustments, and the 
role of BULOG has tended to decline. When OPK was first implemented, program coordination 
was the responsibility of the Ministry for Food and Horticulture. That ministry was dissolved at 
the end of 1999, and BULOG took responsibility for coordinating OPK. In 2007, Menko PMK, 
which before October 2014 had been called the Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare, 
became the program coordinator. The agency with authority over budget expenditure also has 
changed. The power to authorize the budget was held by BULOG in 2005–07 and again in 2010–
11, by the Coordinating Ministry for Community Welfare in 2008–09, and since 2012 by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. Since the beginning of the program, BULOG has been responsible for 
the provision and distribution of rice from acquisition (from BULOG warehouses) through to the 
distribution point.  
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 In theory, the institutionalization of Rastra is geographically sufficient and 
comprehensive, because it involves many cross-sectoral agencies at all levels of government. 
Each agency at the central level tends to carry out its own specific function, such as the Ministry 
of Social Affairs for budget expenditure, BPS for the provision of data, and BULOG for the 
distribution of rice. Meanwhile, interagency cooperation, which determines the program’s 
effectiveness, remains weak. Coordination between levels of government, from the central to the 
district level, is also weak. Weak coordination is largely due to the implementation of 
decentralization in Indonesia since 2001.  
 Regional governments are responsible for implementation in their region, for their 
coordination teams, and for the delivery of rice from the distribution point to beneficiaries. Local 
governments are expected to allocate funds to the regional budget for Rastra, at least for the 
transport of rice from distribution points to recipient households. Regions with larger budgets 
can allocate funds for further development; for example, they can provide funding to expand the 
provision of rice to additional households beyond the initial quota, add a subsidy that lowers the 
buying price for beneficiaries, empower the community through the Padat Karya Rastra (Rastra 
for Work) program, and distribute Rastra through more accessible locations such as local stalls 
and through community groups.  
 The role of regional governments in implementation, especially for budget provision, 
varies. Districts vary in the level of funding from their own budget for Rastra implementation, 
but most districts do not provide any funding at all (Hastuti and others 2008, 28). Some regional 
governments have a negative attitude toward the program, seeing Rastra as a central government 
program that does little good for regions; some governments refuse to implement it altogether 
(TNP2K 2015, 41). Some areas refuse to implement Rastra because the high administrative costs 
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to local governments outweigh the benefits of the small amount of rice received (Hastuti and 
Maxwell 2003, 15). Furthermore, regional governments may be concerned that targeted social 
assistance programs will exacerbate preexisting social conflicts. However, the number of 
regional governments that pay attention to Rastra has grown over the past few years. Some 
districts have even decided to make Rastra free. These districts have not only available funds, but 
also a political desire to lower poverty rates. They also may be responding to awareness-raising 
efforts and encouragement from provincial governments. 
 Rastra program management is regulated by implementation guidelines that are created 
and published each year by the coordination teams at several levels. The Central Rastra 
Coordination Team creates the general Rastra handbook as a policy directive for nationwide 
implementation. Each provincial implementation team creates implementation instructions, and 
each district coordination team creates a technical guide. The implementation instructions and 
technical guides are based on the general guidelines but can be adapted for the local conditions 
and situations of each area. According to Hastuti and others (2008, 6), only a few local 
governments have prepared instructions for the program’s implementation. Even when such 
instructions have been prepared, the contents are merely a copy of the general guidelines, 
without any further detailed stipulations. Rastra institutionalization is also subject to a control 
system that is conducted through oversight, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, and complaint 
handling. Those activities are carried out in stages at all levels of government at assigned periods 
(see annex 7B)  
 Rastra is part of the broader poverty alleviation agenda of the central government and is 
implemented in coordination with other poverty alleviation programs. The institutions for 
poverty alleviation at the central level include the Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan 
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Kemiskinan (TNP2K, National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction), which is 
headed by the vice president. Before TNP2K was established in 2010, the Tim Koordinasi 
Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (TKPK, National Team for Poverty Reduction) operated at the 
national level. Similar bodies operate at the provincial and district levels and are under the 
authority of the head of the district or province. Those teams, made up of a cross-section of 
sectoral and stakeholder representatives, are tasked with coordinating and managing poverty 
alleviation programs, including Rastra.  
 TKPKs at the provincial and district levels are designed to bridge poverty alleviation 
programs, but in actual implementation they are often not functional. In several districts, 
stakeholders told researchers that they were unaware of the existence of the team. According to 
Sumarto, Vothknecht, and Wijaya (2014), TKPK plays a significant role in reducing poverty. In 
districts that have had a TKPK office for at least one year, poverty was found to be more than 1 
percentage point lower than in districts where a TKPK office had not yet been established. In 
addition, in districts that have had a TKPK office for at least three years, poverty incidence was 
found to be nearly 4 percentage points lower than in a district with no TKPK office.  
 
Distribution Mechanisms 
Rastra distribution involves two bodies: BULOG and the regional governments. BULOG is 
responsible for transport from the storage warehouse to the distribution point, and regional 
governments are responsible for transport from the distribution point to each target household 
(figure 7.2). The distribution of Rastra commences when the district government issues a request 
for allocation to the BULOG branch of that region. BULOG then issues a delivery order to the 
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storehouse to release the rice to the appointed work unit (satker). The work unit then sends the 
rice to the agreed-upon distribution point, in accordance with the target households. 
Figure 7.2 Rastra Distribution Channels 
 
 
Note: DO = delivery order; SPA= Surat Permintaan Alokasi (allocation request document); BULOG = 
State Logistics Board. 
 
 Since 2012, local governments have four options for distributing goods from the 
distribution point to households. In practice, almost all use the same method, which involves 
work teams consisting of village officials or heads of neighborhood subdivisions—RTs (groups 
of neighborhood households), RWs (groups of RTs), and hamlets.20 The work team takes the rice 
that has been delivered by BULOG to the distribution point and transports it to local distribution 
centers, except when distribution points also serve as local centers. Distribution centers are 
usually located in a village office. In some regions, primarily outside of Java, local distribution 
centers are located at a subdistrict office or are merged with other village distribution centers 
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because of transportation limitations. Moreover, distribution centers in some villages may spread 
across several locations, such as in homes of neighborhood leaders (of the RT or RW) or hamlet 
leaders. Once the rice arrives, the work team advises households to pick up their allocation of 
rice at the distribution center, using both loudspeakers located at places of worship and word of 
mouth.  
 The total amount of time needed for one distribution usually does not exceed one week. 
On the day the allocation request document is received from the regional government, the 
regional BULOG submits a distribution order to the warehouse, which then delivers rice to the 
distribution point. From the distribution point, the rice is distributed to local distribution centers 
or directly to households. The length of time from when the rice is received at the distribution 
center to the completion of distribution to households is usually one to three days.  
 
Cost of Subsidies 
Through Rastra, the government has provided increasingly large subsidies for rice (figure 7.3). In 
2005, the subsidy amounted to Rp 2,494 per kilogram, which rose each subsequent year and in 
2015 was worth Rp 6,725 per kilogram. This increase occurred because the government’s 
purchase price increased, although the cost to target households remained relatively steady. The 
government’s purchase price increased in line with shifts in the market price of rice, from Rp 
3,494 per kilogram in 2005 to Rp 8,825 per kilogram in 2015, a 2.5-fold increase over 10 years. 
At the same time, the subsidized price for target households at distribution points remained Rp 
1,000 per kilogram from the start of the program to 2007 and only increased once, in 2008, to Rp 
1,600 per kilogram, which still applies today.  
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Figure 7.3 The Price of Rastra Rice and Cost of Government Subsidies in Indonesia, 2002–16 
  
<Fig source>Source: Republik Indonesia 2004–16.  
<Fig note>Note: Subsidy figures for 2015 and 2016 are budget figures.  
Name the panels as “a” and “b”; set panel titles and key labels in sentence case, e.g. “Total 
subsidy (Rp, trillions)”, “Subsidized price”; Govt = Government in first panel; change 
hyphen to zero; in panel b, create y-axis; remove “.0” from y-axis labels.> 
 
 The national budget funds Rastra through to the delivery of rice at each distribution point. 
The cost of Rastra subsidies has risen significantly along with increases in the government’s 
purchase price, the number of target households, the frequency of distribution, and the costs of 
distribution and storage. Those increases were significant over the 2007–13 period. Despite a 
decrease in the number of target households since 2010, the frequency of distribution has 
increased, with 15 distributions in 2013. In 2014, the total cost of the subsidy declined because 
there was no increase in the frequency of distribution (which had increased from 13 deliveries 
per year in 2010–12 to 15 per year in 2013), but in 2016 the distribution cost rose again to Rp 21 
trillion. 
 The Rastra subsidy is used to fund three main activities: procurement, storage, and 
distribution of rice to the distribution points. During 2002–07, most of the subsidy was spent on 
procurement (41–80 percent). Other cost components included repayment of interest (7–13 
percent), operational costs (5–11 percent), management fees (3–6 percent), bank fees (1–2 
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percent), and packaging costs (1–3 percent). Until 2004, costs for historic stock carryover 
accounted for 22–43 percent.  
 
Target Households 
Rastra targets are poor and vulnerable households; however, depending on the data sources used, 
target criteria have changed several times. Until 2005, Rastra used Badan Koordinasi Keluarga 
Berencana Nasional (BKKBN, National Family Planning Coordination Board) data, which at 
that time were the only national-level data that provided family-level information. Target 
households were classified as keluarga pre-sejahtera (pre-prosperous family) and keluarga 
sejahtera 1 (prosperous family 1), the two lowest classifications on a five-point scale of family 
economic welfare. However, for the first two years of implementation, families experiencing 
food insecurity were also included, on the advice of regional governments. After BPS conducted 
a survey of very poor, poor, and near-poor households through the socioeconomic survey of 
2005, Rastra used these data over the period 2006–09.21 From 2010 to 2012, data from the 2008 
Social Protection Program Census (PPLS) were used, and since July 2012, the Basis Data 
Terpadu (BDT, Unified Database), a national database for social protection programs (managed 
by the TNP2K), which is sourced from the 2011 PPLS, has been used. The target groups of the 
final two surveys conducted by BPS are poor and vulnerable households.  
 The number of target recipients of Rastra has changed in line with the levels of poverty 
and budget allocations. The total rose yearly and peaked in 2008, before falling slightly. These 
figures do not necessarily reflect the total number of poor and vulnerable people, because, except 
for 2008–12, Rastra targets did not include all poor and vulnerable groups or households 
recorded in the database for social assistance. Since 2013, Rastra targets have totaled 15.5 
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million households (figure 7.4). That number includes 62 percent of households in the BDT and 
around 24 percent of all households in Indonesia. 
Figure 7.4 Total Number of Poor Households and Rastra Target Households in Indonesia, 1998–2015 
 
Source: Kemenko Kesra 2015. In particular, data for target and total poor households in 1998 and 2000–10 
are from BULOG 2011 (BULOG provided the authors with a table containing Rastra characteristics); data for target 
households in 1999 are from Tabor and Sawit 2001; data for target households in 2011–15 are from Kemenko Kesra 
2015; data for total poor in 2011–12 are the same as for total poor in 2010 (2008 Social Protection Program Census 
data). 
Note: Data on target households in 1998 and 1999 are the highest number of targets. Target households are 
those that the government intended to support. Actual recipients are higher in number due to de facto redistribution 
at the village level. 
 
 Data on the total number of target recipients are used to establish quota allocations from 
the national down to the village level. Allocations are made at different levels. First, the 
government, together with the parliament, determines the national allocation. Second, Menko 
PMK determines the allocations for each province. Third, provincial governors determine the 
allocations for districts and cities. And fourth, the regent or mayor determines the allocations for 
subdistricts and villages. In determining the quota for regional allowances, governors and regents 
or mayors must refer to the quota determined by Menko PMK. However, they can increase the 
total number of target households with funding from their own regional budget. The quota for 
villages cannot be reallocated to other villages unless doing so is discussed at the district level, at 
the request of two villages. Targeting accuracy, an important aspect of achieving program goals, 
has been a primary weakness of the program. The eventual number of recipient households far 
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outweighs the number of target households. Recipient households are not all from poor or 
vulnerable backgrounds; they also include households with adequate levels of welfare. 
Nationally, data from the Susenas, the BPS socioeconomic survey, shows that the number of 
recipient households is around twice as large as the number of target households. When the 
number of target households increased significantly in 2007 and 2008, the gap between the 
number of recipients and targets decreased somewhat before rising again to a twofold difference 
in 2013. In 2014, target households amounted to only 15.5 million, but recipient households 
totaled 33.4 million (figure 7.5).  
Figure 7.5 Total Number of Rastra Target and Recipient Households in Indonesia, 2002–14 
  
<Fig source>Source: BPS 2015b (raw data from 2002 to 2014). 
 
 Half of the households in Indonesia purchase Rastra rice. Figure 7.5 shows a relatively 
steady increase in the number of recipients or households that purchase subsidized rice. In 2002, 
when the total number of households was around 55 million, the number of Rastra-recipient 
households was around 21 million or 38 percent of the total. Since 2007, that proportion has 
reached more than 50 percent, and in 2014—when the total number of households was 65 
million—households receiving Rastra rice constituted 52 percent of the total. 
 Results of data analysis based on expenditure deciles show both inclusion and exclusion 
errors (figure 7.6). In the first error, Rastra recipients are not exclusively from the lower deciles; 
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those in high-expenditure deciles are also included, although the higher the decile, the lower the 
proportion of households receiving Rastra. The rate of leakage is quite high. In 2002–14, target 
households—the first three deciles of expenditure—amounted to between 15 and 33 percent of 
the total number of households. However, in the same period, between 51 and 57 percent of 
recipients were outside these target deciles. 
Figure 7.6 Benefit Incidence in Indonesia, by Expenditure Decile, 2002 and 2014 
 
 
 
Source: BPS 2015b. 
Note: Deciles are divided on the basis of expenditure categories. The higher the decile, the higher the level 
of household expenditure or welfare.  
 
 The exclusion error is seen in the proportion of recipients in the lowest three deciles, 
which demonstrates that some poor and vulnerable households do not receive Rastra. However, 
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poorest groups have the greatest access to Rastra. There was some improvement in 2002–14, 
with those in the bottom 30 percent receiving a greater share of total Rastra benefits. In 2014, the 
proportion of households in the lowest three deciles receiving Rastra was 72, 66, and 63 percent, 
respectively. 
 Field research has produced the same findings: inaccurate targeting is the key weakness 
of the program because not all poor households receive Rastra rice, while many nonpoor 
households do (Hastuti and others 2008, 14). Moreover, Rastra rice tends to be distributed evenly 
across all households in the village—that is, it is distributed to more than the targeted 
households. A field report at the end of 2015 found that all 10 villages studied (across five 
provinces) practiced even distribution. Although the central implementation team makes 
available the list of target households (the beneficiary list), the lists generally are not used at the 
village level to identify recipient households. Instead, they are used only to determine overall 
allocations of rice for each area. Implementers in villages, smaller neighborhood units (RT or 
RW), or hamlets generally determine the recipients.  
 The even distribution of Rastra rice is usually related to the social and political context 
and the limitations of information available to program implementers. Implementers at the local 
level consider rice to be a basic need for all levels of society. Aside from this expectation, local 
implementers also believe that because cooperative community projects (gotong royong) or 
events to collect donations expect everyone to contribute, when assistance is available, the whole 
community is entitled to benefit. Otherwise, they are concerned that community harmony would 
be disrupted and that community members would no longer be willing to assist with community 
projects. By maintaining a fair attitude toward all sections of the community, village 
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implementers, who are usually local leaders, feel assured that they will receive support from all 
sections of society, support that is particularly important leading up to elections.  
The other factor affecting the even or uneven distribution of rice is insufficient or 
inaccurate data. Regional governments have the opportunity to review and update recipient data 
at the start of each year on the basis of consultations with villages. However, a field study in 
2014 found that almost all of the villages visited had not updated their household data (Hastuti 
and others 2014) . In 6 out of 10 villages that did not enact even distribution, the factors that 
influenced the decision included program socialization, public announcement of the list of target 
households, and use of the social protection card.22 
 In several field visits, researchers also found that some poor households did not buy 
Rastra rice when it was available. Usually those households were eligible to buy rice, but they 
did not have enough money at the time that rice was distributed. Other reasons were that they did 
not receive information about the distribution, were not in the area at the time, or arrived late, 
after all of the available rice had run out.  
 
Frequency of Distribution 
Rastra rice is distributed approximately 12 times a year except in 2006, 2007, and 2010–13. In 
2006 and 2007, it was distributed 10 and 11 times, respectively. In 2010–13, one to three extra 
distributions were added annually, to minimize the impact of increasing fuel prices and drought 
and in anticipation of rice price volatility. In 2014 and 2015, the number of distributions returned 
to 12 annually. 
 Basically, Rastra rice is distributed each month, and frequency is regulated by agreements 
between BULOG and district-level coordination teams. If the frequency of distribution increases 
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because of a central government decision, more than one distribution will occur within a given 
month. Conversely, if the decision is made by the regional government, or obstacles such as 
geographic location, weather, or transport affect distribution, distribution may occur less than 
once a month. Where the distribution schedule coincides with the rice harvest, distributions may 
be merged, because the poor tend to have a larger supply of rice, especially those who are 
employed as harvest workers.  
According to an analysis of secondary data and field visits (Hastuti and others 2008), 
Rastra rice is not always distributed monthly. The 2012 TNP2K monitoring study (TNP2K 2015, 
20) produced the same finding: of 220 villages studied, only 46 percent distributed rice monthly. 
In 2011, the Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan (BPKP, the Finance and 
Development Supervisory Agency) found that eligible households in 15 provinces did not 
receive rice monthly. A field study conducted in 2014 also found that half of the 20 study 
villages received Rastra rice each month (Hastuti and others 2014). The other half received rice 
once every two to four months. The reasons for the difference included insufficient allocations, 
long travel times from the BULOG storehouse to the distribution point, the cost savings of 
having fewer trips from the distribution point to local distribution centers, the reduced burden on 
village distributors, and late payments by villages or subdistricts for the previous shipment.  
The frequency at which Rastra rice is delivered to distribution points is not always the 
same as the frequency at which rice is received by households. Recipient households are not 
always able to purchase Rastra rice each time it arrives in the village because distributions are 
based on a rotation system. In such systems, households that received rice in the previous 
distribution cannot receive rice in the following distribution. In that system, half of the 20 
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villages in the field study received Rastra rice only once every two to four months, not every 
month. 
 
Quantity of Rice Distributed and Received by Households 
The household allocation has changed several times because of changes in the state 
government’s budget allocation. The allocation has varied between 10 and 20 kilograms per 
household per month, although the amount is usually between 15 and 20 kilograms (table 7.4). 
Since about 2006, the allocation has been fixed at 15 kilograms. At this quantity, and with the 
frequency described, in any one year each family receives between 150 and 240 kilograms, 
excluding the first year of implementation. In total, between 1.6 million and 3.5 million tons of 
Rastra rice are distributed annually. 
Table 7.4 Allocation of Rastra Rice in Indonesia, 1998–2014 
Year 
Allocation per target household (kilograms) Total allocation 
(tons)a Per distribution Per yeara 
1998 10 or 20b 20–70c 455,843  
1999 20 240 2,506,960d 
2000 20 240 1,800,000  
2001 15 180 1,566,000  
2002 20 240 2,349,600  
2003 20 240 2,059,275  
2004 20 240 2,061,793  
2005 20 240 1,992,000  
2006 15 150 1,624,500  
2007 15 165 2,604,011  
2008 10 or 15e 175 3,342,500  
2009 15 180 3,329,514  
2010 13 or 15f 185 3,235,281  
2011 15 195 3,410,161  
2012 15 195 3,410,161  
2013 15 225 3,494,452  
2014 15 180 2,795,561  
2015 15 180 2,795,561  
Sources: Republik Indonesia 2004–16 ; 1999 recipient data from Tabor and Sawit 2001. 
a. Treated data. 
b. In 1998, the allocations were 10 kilograms from July to November and 20 kilograms in December. 
c. In 1998, the number of target recipients grew each month, from 141,655 households at the start of the 
year, to 9,588,857 at the end of the year. 
d. The figure is based on three distributions, in March, June, and December 1999 (the number of 
households was not the same for each distribution, but ranged from 9.6 million to 10.5 million households).  
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e. In 2008, the allocation of 10 kilograms applied only in January. 
f. In 2010, the allocation was 13 kilograms from January to May. 
 
 In 2013, the BPS estimated that annual rice consumption reached 102 kilograms per 
capita, while the Ministry of Agriculture put this figure at 130 kilograms. Assuming that the 
average household consists of four people, one household requires 408–520 kilograms of rice 
annually or 34–43 kilograms a month. Through Rastra, the government hopes to reduce the 
expenditure burden of poor households and increase their ability to meet their staple food needs. 
If target households receive 15 kilograms of rice per month as stipulated, then the program will 
fulfill approximately one-third to half of their rice needs. 
 Estimates of the number of recipient households and the amount of rice distributed show 
that, over the course of 2002–13, recipient households received only 59–108 kilograms of Rastra 
rice annually. Compared with the stipulated allocations of 150–240 kilograms per household 
annually, the amount of rice purchased reached only 36–61 percent of the amount allocated 
(table 7.5). This finding weakens the program’s ability to meet its objectives, as only 11–26 
percent of household rice needs are being met. 
Table 7.5 Amount of Rice Allocated to and Received by Households Annually in Indonesia, 2002–13 
Year 
Total recipient 
households 
Total rice 
distributed (tons) 
Annual amount of rice for households 
Amount allocated 
(kilograms) 
Amount 
received 
(kilograms) 
% of 
allocation 
received  
2002 20,943,085 2,235,141 240 107 44.47 
2003 22,519,131 2,023,664 240 90 37.44 
2004 19,537,271 2,060,198 240 105 43.94 
2005 22,939,778 1,991,131 240 87 36.17 
2006 24,545,069 1,624,089 150 66 44.11 
2007 29,412,414 1,731,805 165 59 35.68 
2008 30,542,384 3,236,644 175 106 60.56 
2009 30,171,692 3,254,103 180 108 59.92 
2010 31,021,803 3,234,538 185 104 56.36 
2011 32,615,580 3,410,161 195 105 53.62 
2012 33,163,914 3,372,818 195 102 52.15 
2013 32,849,522 3,431,615 225 104 46.43 
<Table source>Sources: Based on BPS 2015a (treated); Republik Indonesia 2004–16  
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 Analyzing the amount of rice purchased by households at the time of the most recent 
distribution (2008–12) and in the past month (2013–14) also shows that the amount of rice 
purchased is lower than stipulated (almost the same as the results of yearly calculations presented 
in table 7.5), that is, only 39–61 percent. The difference between the actual amount purchased 
and the stipulated amount became more pronounced in 2013 and 2014 because the national 
allocation of Rastra rice fell, while the number of recipient households remained stable (figure 
7.7). In some cases, target households could not buy the full allocation because their portion was 
being redistributed (thus became smaller) so that all households (not just targeted households) 
could receive a share of rice. Moreover, not having enough money to buy the rice or missing the 
time of distribution also constrained the purchase of the full allocation.  
Figure 7.7 Estimated Amount of Rice Allocated to and Purchased by Households in One Distribution in Indonesia, 
2008–14 
 
Sources: Based on data from Republik Indonesia 2004–16; BPS 2015b.  
Note: In some distributions between 2008 and 2010, the stipulated allocation amounted to less than 15 
kilograms per household.  
 
 Field research has also found that recipient households receive less than the stipulated 
amount, even less than the estimated calculations, with variation between regions (Hastuti, 
Mawardi, and Sulaksono 2012, 6; Hastuti and Maxwell 2003, 26; Hastuti and others 2008, 21; 
Hastuti and others 2014, 37–38). Recipient households receive, on average, only 5 kilograms per 
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distribution, varying between 1.8 and 15 kilograms per distribution. The amount received each 
month is less because distribution does not occur each month or because the system rotates 
recipients. Variation occurs not only between villages, but also between subvillage units 
(hamlets, RTs, and RWs), because implementers have the full authority to make decisions about 
how Rastra rice is divided. Some improvement is evident in the application of stipulated 
distribution procedures at the village level, but the number of such villages remains limited. 
 The World Bank (2015) has noted the existence of fraud or missing rice in the 
implementation of Rastra. During two periods in 2012–13, not all of the available Rastra rice 
was purchased by households, and it is estimated that Rastra lost 38.7 and 48.2 percent of the 
total rice allocation, respectively (table 7.6). In the second period, the estimated amount of 
missing rice was greater, possibly because additional distributions over that period were not well 
promoted among beneficiary households and local implementers.  
Table 7.6 Unpurchased (Missing) Rastra Rice in Indonesia, 2012–13 
 
Official benefit 
(kilograms per Amount of rice (kilograms, millions) 
Missing rice as a % 
of rice 
Period household) Procured  Distributed  Purchased  Missing  purchased  
December 2012–
February 2013 
45 697.5 684.945 419.62 265.325 38.7 
June–August 2013 75 1,162.5 1,141.575 591.45 550.125 48.2 
Source: BPS data (treated) in World Bank 2015. 
Note: Missing rice refers to the difference between the amount of rice distributed and the amount purchased 
by households.  
 
Prices Paid by Households 
The government sets the price for Rastra rice at an amount far lower than its own purchase price 
and retail prices: Rp 1,000 per kilogram until 2007, and Rp 1,600 per kilogram since 2008. In 
2015–16, the subsidized price did not reach 20 percent of the government purchase price (Rp 
8,325 per kilogram). Even when compared with the average retail price between 2011 and 2014, 
which went up to Rp 8,090–Rp 9,730 per kilogram (BPS 2015a), the subsidized price was only 
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16 to 20 percent of the retail value. Using retail prices as an approximate benchmark, in 2014 
recipients saved about Rp 8,130 per kilogram or Rp 122,000 a month if they received Rastra in 
line with the regulations. 
 In reality, recipient households usually pay more than the official subsidized price of 
Rastra rice. Nationally, during 2004–14, households paid 15 to 34 percent more than the 
stipulated price (figure 7.8). The percentage increased year to year; however, the rate of increase 
tended to slow. In 2004–07, when the subsidized price was Rp 1,000, the purchase rice rose by 
about 4 percent annually, whereas in 2008–14, when the official subsidized price was Rp 1,600, 
the price rose only 2 percent annually. 
Figure 7.8 Average Stipulated Price of Rastra Rice and Price Paid by Households in Indonesia, 2004–14 
 
Source: BPS 2015b (treated). 
 
 A large proportion of households pay more for Rastra rice than the official subsidized 
price. Some studies found payments in line with the official price, but this holds true in a small 
number of areas and households. TNP2K reported that, of 220 villages studied, only 29 percent 
sold Rastra rice at the prescribed rate (Hastuti, Mawardi, and Sulaksono 2012). SMERU (Hastuti 
and others 2014) found that only 2 of 20 villages studied applied the stipulated price. The other 
villages applied higher prices, in some cases Rp 3,000 per kilogram, almost twice the official 
amount. Prices are decided at the village level, and, in some areas, prices are changed by the RT, 
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RW, or hamlet heads who distribute the rice. Consequently, the price of Rastra rice can vary 
within a village.  
 Increases in the official price of Rastra rice are primarily the result of recipient 
households having to pay for the transport of rice from the distribution point to the local 
distribution center. Where this occurs, the local government has not allocated funds to cover 
those costs, or the amount allocated is insufficient. Another cause is that recipients are burdened 
with the cost of paying incentives to distributors and transport operators and of raising funds for 
community construction projects or social activities. However, households are generally willing 
to pay higher than the stipulated Rastra price because the higher subsidized price is still 
significantly lower than the market price, resulting in costs 60–80 percent below market prices. 
 Moreover, the World Bank (2012) also found that recipient households receive rice at 
lower quantities and higher prices than stipulated. Given this finding, the benefit to households is 
much lower than it should be. The proportional value of the Rastra program to households—the 
percentage of household expenditure—should have been 8 percent in 2004, 6 percent in 2007, 
and 8 percent in 2010; in reality, the value of Rastra rice received as a proportion of household 
expenditure remained at only 2 percent.  
 
Rice Quality 
Since the program was initiated, program guidelines have stipulated a medium quality of rice for 
Rastra, but other indicators of quality have been subject to change (Departemen Dalam Negeri 
and BULOG 2004–07. The 2012 general guidelines for Rastra state that rice is to be of medium 
quality and in good condition, in accordance with the Presidential Instruction on Rice (Kemenko 
Kesera 2015. In previous years, the general guidelines were even more specific, referring to 
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medium-quality rice in good condition and free of pests. In the guidelines covering 2013–15, the 
specifications for rice to be in good condition and free of pests were removed, so that the quality 
standard is now based only on the presidential instruction that is in effect (GoI 2015a). Thus, 
according to Presidential Instruction no. 5, 2015, BULOG rice is to contain a maximum of 14 
percent moisture, a maximum of 20 percent broken grains, a maximum of 2 percent groats, and a 
minimum whiteness level of 95 percent (GoI 2015b). 
 The quality of Rastra rice received by households varies over time and between regions 
and is subject to frequent complaints. Households often receive rice that is not fit for 
consumption, because it is yellow, has a bad odor, is infested, is broken, or is powdery. Rastra 
rice that appears to be of good quality can often still be unpleasant to eat.  
 The general guidelines already regulate the quality of rice, but quality is hard to enforce, 
especially because the amount of rice distributed is significant. Rice that is to be distributed 
should be inspected at the storehouse and at the distribution point. The officials who are 
supposed to inspect the rice are often insufficiently aware of the technical aspects of grading 
medium-quality rice. According to BPKP (Suardini 2013, 11), Rastra officials do not examine 
the quality or check the weight of rice at the storehouse before transporting it to distribution 
points. The general guidelines also state that rice not meeting the quality standards can be 
returned to BULOG and will be replaced within 48 hours. In practice, putting that dictate into 
practice is difficult because rice that is to be returned has to be repacked and transported to the 
distribution point or to BULOG. The associated costs of those two processes are not included in 
the calculation of price at the local level. Aside from those hurdles, the quality indicators in the 
presidential instruction are quite technical and difficult for the general population to understand. 
The community usually assesses quality on the basis of its appearance, such as the presence of 
 46 
bugs, a high level of broken grains, color, smell, and consistency after cooking. Those 
assessments are incompatible with the quality regulations, so that rice may meet the official 
standards but be considered poor quality by the community. 
 Although recipients may object to the quality of Rastra rice, the low cost when compared 
with retail prices leads them to continue purchasing it. Households compensate for those 
shortcomings in the way they use the rice. For example, households usually mix Rastra and retail 
rice, mill the rice again to improve its color, wash it with soap, or cook it with pandan leaf. Such 
efforts reduce the benefits to participants. 
 The low quality of rice has led some households to resell the rice, and there are 
indications that BULOG sometimes procures rice from previous distributions. A 2014 field study 
found that households in Central Java could sell the rice to resellers at a price of Rp 5,000–Rp 
5,700 per kilogram (Hastuti and others 2014). Households in some regions are encouraged to sell 
their rice, and resellers are already waiting nearby at the time of the Rastra distribution. With the 
presence of such practices, the quality of Rastra rice will continue to decline, along with the 
benefits.  
 In 2013, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK, the Corruption Eradication Commission) 
also found indications of similar practices (KPK 2013). The commission stated that lack of 
precise targeting, rice that is unfit for consumption, and the difference between the Rastra price 
and the market price are incentives for households to sell Rastra rice to purchase better-quality 
rice. The practice of buying and reselling rice offers an attractive benefit, and there are always 
traders willing to purchase it. The KPK investigation identified a trail from intermediary 
collectors to rice traders, to wholesalers, and then to BULOG partners, which then redistribute 
rice to regional BULOG divisions.  
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Payment Systems 
According to Rastra regulations, households pay the distributor in cash for the rice when it is 
distributed at the village level. If an additional cost is incurred for transporting rice from the 
distribution point to the beneficiaries and it is not fully funded by the regional budget, 
households contribute to covering those costs. Although household payments are usually made in 
cash, village payments may vary. From the local distribution center, money collected from 
beneficiaries is forwarded to the village-level distributor, who then makes a bank deposit or 
delivers cash directly to a BULOG or a subdistrict government office. BULOG usually allows a 
one- to two-week grace period from the time the rice is delivered to the local distribution center. 
BULOG begins the next distribution once the previous account has been paid. However, in some 
areas, BULOG has a different policy. Villages must pay up-front, before the rice has been 
distributed. These villages collect payments from households ahead of time or use third-party 
funding. 
 
Rice Procurement and Storage 
Aside from implementing Rastra distribution, BULOG also has a mandate to procure and store 
government rice, including rice used for the Rastra program, both from domestic and imported 
sources. Government rice procurement prioritizes domestically produced rice and, through 
BULOG, purchases rice from farmers across Indonesia who usually have a small amount of land, 
around 0.5 hectares. The trading chain from farmers to BULOG generally involves small-scale 
and large-scale traders and BULOG’s own trading partners. The capacity to purchase rice in this 
way relies on domestic rice production, which is unstable, largely because of the influence of 
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climate conditions, natural disasters, and pest infestations. At the same time, the amount of rice 
required by Rastra is decided annually and does not take into account levels of domestic 
production. When domestic rice procurement does not meet the total needs of the program, 
BULOG has the authority to compensate for the shortfall with imported rice.  
 
Efforts to Improve the Rastra Program  
Various research organizations, universities, nongovernmental organizations, and other 
organizations have undertaken studies, provided criticism, and given input to improve the 
program. Not all of those recommendations have been used, but they have at least encouraged 
the government to address problems in the program. At several points, modifications have been 
made to improve Rastra. However, not all modifications have led to improvements; some 
changes have even been counterproductive. 
 One reason Rastra has not met its objectives has been ineffective promotion of the 
program. In the past few years, especially in 2012, program implementers made intensive efforts 
to promote the program. The efforts took the form of making public service announcements in 
the print and electronic media, sending posters and banners to villages, and using direct 
education of local governments. The community engagement approach was not always 
successful because Rastra provides individual assistance that may cause envy and conflict. In 
contrast, road and irrigation programs provide broader public good, and in those cases the 
community engagement approach works relatively well. In 2013, when Rastra became part of the 
Acceleration and Broadening of Social Protection Program, a program to alleviate the impact of 
rising fuel prices, the government also provided households with brochures that contained further 
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information about Rastra. Unfortunately, not all households read and understood the information 
(Hastuti and others 2014).  
 Efforts to increase public knowledge about Rastra have had some effect in fostering 
regional governments’ interest in the program, which has taken the shape, for example, of free 
Rastra programs (that is, regional governments pay for all Rastra rice received by households in 
their jurisdiction). However, regional governments that are not concerned with Rastra are far 
greater in number, and some refuse to implement the program altogether. The hope that regional 
governments can be involved in eliminating differences between the price paid by households 
and the stipulated price has not been realized. An effort to create a legal umbrella for the 
involvement of regional governments has yet to succeed in engaging regional governments.23 
 The problem of accurate targeting is an acute challenge that hampers the ability of the 
program to achieve its aims. In 2002, the government attempted to respond to this problem by 
changing the name of the program from OPK to Raskin. It was hoped that the inclusion of the 
word miskin (poor) in the full program name would limit the access of nonpoor people. 
However, another recent name change, to Rastra, could be counterproductive. The full title, 
beras sejahtera (“prosperous rice,” meaning rice for prosperous families), could be used as a 
justification for allowing well-off families to access the program.  
 In response to the complaint that inaccurate data had caused mistargeting, the 
government undertook several population censuses through the national agency, BPS: the 
Susenas socioeconomic survey in 2005, the PPLS for 2008 and 2011, and the 2015 BDT, which 
is still being updated. Moreover, to respond to the absence of local government involvement in 
data collection, since 2013 the government has given local governments the opportunity to verify 
household data through village meetings. 
 50 
 Lack of transparency also produces inaccurate targeting. The official beneficiary list 
created by the central government is used as a token administrative gesture at the local level. 
Furthermore, the bargaining position of beneficiaries in ensuring that they can obtain their 
entitlements is limited because of strong asymmetries in access to information at the local level. 
Beneficiaries often do not know that the beneficiary list exists or that they are entitled to the 
allocation of rice.  
 One important step the government has taken is the agenda for unifying social protection 
targeting. The goal of unifying records is made possible by creation of the unified database 
(BDT) for social protection programs, which grew out of the PPLS for 2011. BDT is a national 
database that contains information on households in the bottom 40 percent of the population, 
who are potential beneficiaries of social protection programs. Rastra was one of the first social 
protection programs to use BDT data to identify target beneficiaries in 2012.  
 In 2012, the TNP2K and the Abdul Latief Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) undertook 
a study and field trial in six districts and cities. The study investigated the effectiveness of two 
options for dealing with targeting accuracy in Rastra: use of a Rastra card and direct involvement 
of the community in Rastra distribution at the village level. The study found that the two options, 
accompanied by intensive social promotion, had a positive effect on targeting accuracy and the 
amount of rice received. The use of a Rastra card had a greater impact, at a lower cost. The 
TNP2K and J-PAL submitted the results to policy makers in December 2012 and received a very 
positive response. Consequently, at the time of the fuel subsidy adjustment in 2013, the 
Indonesian government launched the social protection card (KPS). The card allows about 15.5 
million households to obtain social assistance and protection (Rastra), temporary direct cash 
assistance (BLSM), and poor students assistance (BSM). The KPS is useful for identifying 
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beneficiaries, especially in the BSM program. Before the card’s introduction, the BSM relied on 
school authorities, especially school principals, to identify target beneficiaries. Households now 
play a greater role, with students able to take a proactive role by showing their family’s card to 
school administrators. The KPS program can play a strategic role in increasing the effectiveness 
of beneficiary targeting and complementarity between social protection programs.  
 Several adjustments have been made with regard to weaknesses in the quality and 
quantity of Rastra rice; however, these adjustments have not been consistent with the aims of 
improving the program. In terms of quantity, for example, in 2008 BULOG began to provide rice 
sacks with a capacity equal to that of household allocations, that is, 15 kilograms. The hope was 
that local distributors would deliver rice that was already in the correct amount and not burden 
households with the cost of repacking and weighing. That policy did not last long and did not 
reach all areas. Since 2013, the general Rastra guidelines have regulated that Rastra rice be made 
available in 15-kilogram or 50-kilogram packs. The larger package is not ideal for household 
distribution, but it makes the packing process easier for BULOG, because 50 kilograms is the 
standard size of rice pack sold at markets. With regard to quality, when the 2013 general 
guidelines were issued, program management no longer had a general indicator of quality. 
Instead of indicating that the rice had to be in good condition and free of pests, the only 
indicators were highly technical and found in a different document, the Presidential Instruction 
on Rice, which limits the community’s ability to assess the quality of rice they are given. 
 Against this backdrop, the government has recently decided to embark on a large-scale 
pilot of e-vouchers as an alternative to the current in-kind provision of Rastra rice (World Bank 
2017). The voucher program would share some similarities with the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) in the United States, which is discussed in this volume (chapter 6). 
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Starting in early 2017, the experiment will support more than 1.43 million households and 
involve some 14,000 merchants in 44 cities.24 Each target household will receive a voucher 
worth Rp 110,000 per month. While initial plans included the use of vouchers restricted to rice 
and eggs (GoI 2017), at the time of finalizing this chapter, they included rice and sugar as well.25 
The e-voucher system will be expanded gradually to other cities and districts throughout 2017–
19 and be scaled up nationally by 2020. 
 The transition toward e-vouchers pursues multiple objectives, namely, to improve 
targeting of households in the bottom 25 percent of the income ladder; provide targeted 
beneficiaries with better access to nutritious food; give more choices and control for the 
beneficiaries on when, what type, and how much rice and other eligible food commodities they 
buy; encourage retail businesses at the grassroots level; provide beneficiaries and small 
merchants with access to financial services; and, finally, save costs in the government’s budget 
by making the business process more efficient. Voucher cards would serve as debit cards, with 
cash being transferred to recipients’ savings accounts. The savings would not be cashed out, but 
could only be used at designated merchants to buy eligible food commodities. Although the 
process is in its infancy and solid assessments will be required, the use of voucher cards may 
help to reorient Rastra’s nature and design parameters toward cash-based assistance in line with 
other country experiences discussed in this volume.  
 Future studies could deepen the knowledge and practice on some key questions that 
would remain relevant regardless of the shape the program might take. For instance, the 
forthcoming pilot could provide an opportunity to explore the comparative cost-effectiveness of 
alternative interventions in the form of quasi-cash (vouchers) and in-kind transfers. The pilot 
could present ideal conditions for an in-depth assessment of costs and impacts among 
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beneficiaries—and do so within a large-scale test as opposed to small-scale experiments. 
Relatedly, future research could also investigate the levels of community satisfaction with social 
protection programs in Indonesia, with food subsidies being one area of focus. Moreover, it 
might be useful to explore the general-equilibrium effects of subsidy reforms under different 
scenarios (pace of reforms) and modalities (cash or vouchers). This effort could include 
implications across the main sectors and stakeholders, such as farmers, food prices, employment, 
and consumer welfare. Finally, Indonesia’s possible reform process should be informed by 
practical lessons emerging from cross-country experiences on how best to manage the transition 
from in-kind transfers to vouchers. In this regard, this volume might provide timely insights in 
that direction. 
 
Lessons Learned  
Historically, Indonesia placed heavy emphasis on price stability and food sufficiency. After 
1998, this approach came at a cost of high domestic prices, which were achieved largely through 
trade restrictions, floor prices, and barriers to entry into logistical services. More recently, retail 
food prices are substantially higher in Indonesia than in neighboring countries, which marks a 
departure from past scenarios in which prices were stabilized at levels modestly above world 
prices. For example, between 1969 and 2014, domestic prices were 7 percent higher, on average, 
than international prices; however, since 2008, the difference has grown to about 34 percent 
(table 7.1). 
 While the current approach helped to cope with recent global food crises, it also 
underscores the difference between stability and affordability. Maintaining prices at stable but 
exceptionally high levels implies that, on the one hand, Indonesian consumers have been 
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massively “taxed” by public trade and agricultural policies and that, on the other hand, as the 
country advances in its structural transformation, the poor, in particular, are increasingly net food 
buyers—that is, they do not necessarily benefit from high food prices. For example, according to 
the World Food Programme (WFP 2015, 115), the most food-insecure districts “have very high 
consumption to production ratios, meaning that their requirements for consumption far exceed 
what they produce. They are therefore dependent on markets and purchasing for the majority of 
their staple foods.” Specifically, their consumption-production ratio is 35.4, compared with only 
1.9 in the least vulnerable districts. 
 At the same time, the traditional commodity-based approach of Rastra has been in place 
for almost two decades, and its core nature and business model have remained largely intact. 
This chapter has exposed a range of inefficiencies inherent to this model, including issues 
through the chain of supply and distribution that significantly affect the quantity and quality of 
social assistance provision.  
 The experience of the program illustrates the “balance wheel” function of a food-based 
program in a context where food (rice) self-sufficiency is a core policy priority and where 
ensuring stable food prices is functional to such a vision. Indonesia was relatively successful in 
attaining that goal, although at a cost of high food prices for consumers (and producers) and a 
comparatively limited role for trade. While the general architecture of the program has not 
changed dramatically, steps have recently been taken to integrate Rastra better into the overall 
social protection system. The government has spent significant resources on the program, and 
millions of households have benefited from the provision of affordable rice. However, in 
practice, several aspects of the program are inconsistent with its design. From the very 
beginning, the program has faced obstacles, especially in meeting its benchmarks. Additionally, 
 55 
program implementation costs tend to be high when compared with program effectiveness. In 
terms of the amount, quality, and frequency of the rice distributions, the rice received by 
households does not meet the stipulations of the original program design. Target beneficiaries 
who have been identified centrally do not necessarily become the actual recipients of the 
program. On average, target recipients who do buy Rastra rice receive only one-third of the rice 
to which they are entitled. Simple mistargeting or elite capture does not fully explain the receipt 
of rice by ineligible households. Local social pressures lead to uniform distribution because 
equal allocation is perceived to be the only fair and hence politically acceptable approach. In this 
regard, the published literature lays out a range of changes in implementation to improve the 
targeting.26 
 Available research suggests options for significant reforms of the in-kind component, 
should it be retained as one of the modalities in the reformed program, ranging from revisiting 
business procedures to aligning food provision with cash transfers. For instance, the Indonesian 
government has implemented several social protection programs in the form of cash transfers. In 
2005, it set up BLT, a national direct cash transfer program, and then in 2013 introduced BLSM, 
a community temporary direct assistance program. Both programs targeted the same households 
as the Rastra program. Numerous studies showed that vouchers and cash transfers—as well as 
other food-oriented social assistance programs discussed in this volume—outperform Rastra in 
several dimensions, including the accuracy of targeting, accuracy of the amount of assistance 
received, and flexibility to meet varying needs of recipients. Another study also found that Rastra 
is less effective in reducing poverty and improving nutrition than programs based on direct cash 
assistance or food coupons (OECD 2014). As part of the government’s move (at least in terms of 
pilots) toward voucher-based assistance, the role of BULOG could be refocused on fulfilling its 
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primary function—that is, stabilizing the price of staple goods that are not limited to rice. In this 
regard, lessons from other case studies summarized in chapter 1 and presented in this volume, 
such as SNAP in chapter 6, are particularly relevant for Indonesia. 
 Depending on how it is planned and implemented, such a process may help to put the 
country on a track that is broadly aligned with the experience of other countries—such as those 
explored in this volume—that have undergone a more or less complete transition from in-kind 
food assistance to vouchers or even cash transfers. As those examples illustrate, the journey 
toward a change in transfer modalities is seldom linear and simple, with several critical issues 
(for example, the  role of BULOG, effects on rice price stability) that will likely entail a 
thorough process of review. In other words, much-awaited reforms are moving in the right 
direction, but they seldom happen overnight, and it may not be desirable for them to happen that 
way. 
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Notes 
1. The Rastra program has changed names several times. Initially, when the program was 
first implemented in July 1998, it was titled Special Market Operation. In 2002, to reflect the 
nature of the program, the government changed the name to Raskin, an acronym for beras untuk 
keluarga miskin (rice for poor families). It was hoped that this title would improve targeting 
accuracy, expecting that the nonpoor would feel ashamed to receive program benefits. The name 
Raskin continued to be used, but during 2006–11, its full title shifted to beras untuk rumah 
tangga miskin (rice for poor households) and then to subsidi beras bagi masyarakat 
berpendapatan rendah (rice subsidized for low-income communities) in 2012–15. In 2016, 
another name change—to Rastra or beras sejahtera (literally prosperous rice)—prompted some 
debate, because it could be interpreted as rice for prosperous families and thus become a 
justification for giving more well-off families access to the program. 
2. This section was drafted primarily by C. Peter Timmer and grows out of his more than 
four decades as a policy analyst and adviser in Indonesia. It builds on an earlier paper for the 
World Bank that sought to understand how Indonesia managed to stabilize rice prices for a 
quarter of a century, from 1973 to 1998.  
3. Falcon Team (1985). The team was composed of Walter P. Falcon, M. Margaret 
Hastings, Leona A. Mears, Scott R. Pearson, and C. Peter Timmer. 
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4. This section draws especially on Timmer (1995), which sought to distill lessons from 
25 years of personal involvement in the process of stabilizing rice prices in Indonesia. 
5. See Kaplan (1984) for a fascinating historical account of the relationship between 
urban masses and their rulers with respect to provisioning of basic foodstuffs. 
6. This approach works well when incomes are reasonably stable, but it fails when there 
is an economywide collapse, as in 1998. See Timmer (2010) for further discussion of the 
macroeconomic setting for successful rice price stabilization. 
7. See Timmer (1990) for an early summary and Timmer (2014) for an evaluation of how 
Indonesian price policy changed between the food crisis in 1972–73 and the one in 2007–08. 
8. President Suharto’s determination to avoid rice imports took international trade as a 
balancing mechanism off the policy agenda. Indeed, Indonesia was supposed to be self-sufficient 
in rice—after all, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations had given him a 
gold medal in 1985 for that achievement. By the early 1990s, President Suharto’s economic 
advisers had convinced him that “self-sufficiency on trend” was a more appropriate policy 
objective. Limited imports again become operationally feasible, although obtaining permission 
from the president remained difficult and BULOG was no longer able to count on imports for 
short-run supply management. The political difficulty in arranging for rice imports remains to 
this day. 
9. See Williams and Wright (1991) for a sophisticated analysis of the limits to price 
stabilization with finite stocks. 
10. See Timmer (2014) for a review of different approaches to valuing grain reserves. 
11. Relatively little is known publicly about the financial costs of BULOG’s activities to 
stabilize rice prices. The best estimate is for 1991, a year when BULOG was actively managing 
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the price stabilization effort solely on the basis of its domestic buffer stock. For that year, the full 
financial costs of BULOG’s rice activities were US$233 million, which amounted to 0.11 
percent of total GDP and about 1.2 percent of the national budget. See Pearson (1993) for more 
details. 
12. For example, international financial institutions argued that high domestic rice prices 
were the main factor causing poverty to rise, whereas the government and popular press 
castigated such views, often dramatically. A highly popular political cartoon in Kompas, a 
leading daily newspaper, showed a large grain harvester representing an international financial 
institution cutting down peasants. 
13. This section draws heavily on World Bank (2006, ch. 2). Timmer was the main 
author of chapter 2. See Timmer (2004, 2010) for further discussion of the links between a 
strategy of pro-poor growth based on agricultural development and a stable food system. 
14. Indonesia provides several global lessons. It is the original home of the dual 
economy. Boeke’s experience during the Dutch colonial administration of Java led him to 
identify two types of economic agents—“rational” and “traditional”—with almost entirely 
separate spheres of economic activity (Boeke 1946). Lewis (1954) built his Nobel Prize–winning 
model of the dual economy with unlimited supplies of labor on the behavior of such agents 
(Timmer 2005, 15). 
15. The crude IPPG shown in table 7.2 is based on an analytical relationship between the 
overall incidence of poverty and the observed average income elasticity of demand (based on 
regression analysis of long-run, time-series data). The income elasticity of food energy for the 
entire period from 1880 to 1990, estimated to be 0.313, is used as the long-run base, scaled to 1 
(italicized in the table). It is multiplied by the long-run growth rate in per capita income, 0.89 
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percent per year, to generate the long-run average IPPG of 0.89. The income elasticity for each 
separate time period is then scaled relative to the long-run average and multiplied by the growth 
rate in per capita income to generate the IPPG for each epoch. The IPPG incorporates both the 
growth and the distributional dimensions of pro-poor growth and is thus a country-specific 
version of equation 1 in World Bank (2004).  
16. The Dutch forced the Netherland East Indies, the Dutch colonial name for Indonesia, 
to stay on the gold standard well after regional competitors, including the Japanese, devalued. 
17. At 2.37, the IPPG was surprisingly high during the Sukarno era, when economic 
policy is widely regarded to have been a disaster. But a modest recovery from the quarter century 
of depression and wars, combined with average per capita incomes rising 1.5 percent per year 
and large average income elasticity for food energy, suggests that what growth there was actually 
reached the poor. 
18. Data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 
19. The administrative levels of desa (village) and kelurahan (urban village) are roughly 
equivalent, with desa used in most rural areas and kelurahan in most urban regions. This chapter 
uses “village” to refer to both.  
20. RT, or neighborhood unit, is the smallest unit of local administration, consisting of a 
number of households. RW is a unit of local administration consisting of several RTs within a 
village. 
21. Over this period, BPS verified the 2005 data twice. The first verification was 
conducted in 2006 because regional government data were then used for Rastra targeting in 
2007. BPS verified the data again in 2007, through the Basic Health and Education Services 
Survey conducted in 15 provinces, and the results were used for Rastra targeting in 2009.  
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22. Indeed, socialization helps community members to gain more information about 
Rastra; public announcement of the list of target households informs the community which 
households are eligible to be beneficiaries; and use of the social protection cards, which are 
given only to target households, means that only the holders of the card are eligible to get Rastra 
rice. 
23. Expectations were outlined in the Circular of the Ministry of Internal Affairs no. 
900/2634/SJ 2013, on the Allocation of Payments for Rastra Distribution Costs from Distribution 
Point to Distribution Centre. 
24. In addition to implementation of the e-voucher pilot, the regular Rastra scheme is still 
conducted in 470 other cities or districts (kota or kabupaten). 
25. Anecdotal field observations show that rice, oil, and sugar are sometimes provided. 
26. In particular, applied research has pointed to several suggestions. Among those, the 
program could minimize the amount of “missing rice,” indicated by an increase in the amount 
received by target households; improvements in rice quality could be achieved by adhering to the 
quality standards set by the government; and targeting accuracy and processes for updating 
information could be enhanced by adopting a dynamic approach that enrolls new beneficiaries 
while maintaining verification and validation steps that ensure their eligibility. This approach 
could be achieved by implementing a decentralized on-demand application involving local 
government and the Ministry of Social Affairs. For example, the size of the benefit—the amount 
of rice actually received by households—could be adjusted by taking into account the 
dependency ratio of each household. The program could improve distribution mechanisms 
through the use of a card or voucher. Cards could empower poor households to demand the full 
amount of subsidy to which they are entitled (Banerjee and others 2015). A reduction in the price 
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paid by recipient households could be considered. This price reduction should be in line with the 
stipulated price by setting a maximal subsidized price, by ensuring that governments fund the 
total cost of distribution to households, or by involving regional governments or the central 
government. Administrators should consider improving transparency, which can be done through 
increased promotion and communication, especially related to eligibility, size of the benefit, 
distribution mechanisms, and frequency of distribution. Finally, governance could be improved 
by designating a specific agency with the authority and responsibility for program 
implementation and by designating BULOG as a third party that undertakes provision and 
distribution. 
